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PROSOCIAL CONTRACTS: MAKING
RELATIONAL CONTRACTS MORE
RELATIONAL
SARAH DADUSH*
I.
INTRODUCTION
When the COVID-19 pandemic began to choke the global economy in 2020,
many fashion brands suspended or canceled their garment orders, including those
partially manufactured, completely manufactured, and even shipped.1 When
orders were not canceled outright, suppliers were forced to contend with major
payment delays and demands from buyers for deal-eviscerating discounts.2 This
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1. See COVID-19 and Garment Workers, WORKER RTS. CONSORTIUM (2021),
https://www.workersrights.org/issues/covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/T95L-C3GQ] (listing various reports);
see also Mark Anner, Viewpoint: How Major Apparel Brands Responded to the Covid-19 Pandemic, in
FASHION TRANSPARENCY INDEX 81 (2021) (stating that many brands “initially cancelled their orders
without paying, causing enormous harm for suppliers and their workers in early 2020”); Annie Kelly,
Garment Workers Going Hungry as Fallout from Cancelled Orders Takes Toll – Report, GUARDIAN
(Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/dec/03/garment-workers-goinghungry-as-fallout-from-cancelled-orders-takes-toll-report [https://perma.cc/PU98-YWE3] (“Fashion
brands cancelled an estimated $15bn of orders when the global lockdown closed retail outlets . . . [m]any
of these orders had already been completed but brands refused to accept shipment, leaving suppliers
stranded with millions of pounds of unsold stock.”); Mei-Ling McNamara, World’s Garment Workers
Face Ruin as Fashion Brands Refuse to Pay $16bn, GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/oct/08/worlds-garment-workers-face-ruin-asfashion-brands-refuse-to-pay-16bn [https://perma.cc/R8M6-DAED] (“In Bangladesh, more than a
million garment workers have been fired or furloughed as a result of cancelled orders and buyers’ refusal
to pay . . . .”). For a discussion of how buyers have used contract provisions to cancel orders during the
COVID-19 pandemic, see generally WORKER RTS. CONSORTIUM, FARCE MAJEURE: HOW GLOBAL
APPAREL BRANDS ARE USING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC TO STIFF SUPPLIERS AND ABANDON
WORKERS (2020) [hereinafter FARCE MAJEURE] (discussing fashion brands’ possibly unlawful use of
force majeure clauses to cancel contracts at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic).
2. Major Apparel Brands Delay & Cancel Orders in Response to Pandemic, Risking Livelihoods of
Millions of Garment Workers in their Supply Chains, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE
CENTER (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/major-apparel-brandsdelay-cancel-orders-in-response-to-pandemic-risking-livelihoods-of-millions-of-garment-workers-intheir-supply-chains/ [https://perma.cc/R6Q3-TUCF]; RE:STRUCTURE LAB, FORCED LAB. EVIDENCE
BRIEF, COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND SOURCING 14 (2021) (“[C]orporate sourcing practices,
including order cancellations, invocation of Force Majeure clauses, refusal to pay for orders already
produced, and demands for discounted prices on existing and new orders, unleashed a domino effect in
supply chains, leading to widespread factory closures and bankruptcy, mass worker layoffs, and a
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made it all but impossible for suppliers to cover their costs, including labor costs.
As a result, many apparel manufacturers shuttered, throwing millions of garment
workers into unemployment, deeper poverty and food insecurity, and more
dangerous exposure to the virus.3 Buyers whose contracts contained a force
majeure clause invoked them to cancel their orders, regardless of whether the
clauses contemplated pandemics as a force majeure event.4 However, even
without such clauses, many buyers simply exited their contracts.5 They did not do
this because they were allowed to contractually, but because buyer-firms,
particularly big fashion brands, operate in a social context that stacks the
commercial deck in their favor. The apparel sector is marked by particularly stark
power disparities between the firms that make the stuff and the firms that buy
the stuff. The latter can generally (mis)behave as they wish, with only passing
concern for the economic and social repercussions of their actions.
In this anything-goes context, buyer-firms often engage in what I refer to as
“extractive contracting” with their suppliers. With extractive contracting, the
more powerful party—usually the buyer—prepares and performs the contract so
as to extract the maximum possible commercial value from the deal, regardless
of any negative social impacts. From a social cost of contract perspective, the
problem with extractive contracts is that they place severe economic strain on
suppliers and, by extension, on workers’ human rights, health, and safety.6 Until
now, this has not posed a serious problem for firms, but, as formal and informal
policing of corporate social performance intensifies across the globe, extractive
contracts may also become a problem from a compliance perspective.
deterioration of working and living conditions, including increased exposure to forced labour.”)
(emphasis omitted).
3. FARCE MAJEURE, supra note 1, at 1–2 (stating that, in Bangladesh alone, an estimated six billion
U.S. dollars’ worth of orders has been suspended or canceled since the pandemic began, leading to mass
unemployment – 1 million in Bangladesh – and pushing many manufacturers into or near bankruptcy);
WORKER RTS. CONSORTIUM, FIRED, THEN ROBBED: FASHION BRANDS’ COMPLICITY IN WAGE
THEFT DURING COVID-19 12 (2021) (“WRC has confirmed severance theft during the last 12 months at
31 garment factories in nine countries . . . [i]n the aggregate, these factories deprived 37,637 workers of
an estimated $39.8 million in legally due compensation.”); WORKER RTS. CONSORTIUM, HUNGER IN
THE APPAREL SUPPLY CHAIN: SURVEY FINDINGS ON WORKERS’ ACCESS TO NUTRITION DURING
COVID-19 2 (2020) (reporting that 88% of surveyed garment workers suffered from reduced food
consumption as a result of diminished income during the pandemic, with 34% experiencing hunger at
least once per week and 20% experiencing hunger every day); MARK ANNER, PENN STATE CTR. FOR
GLOB. WORKERS’ RTS., LEVERAGING DESPERATION: APPAREL BRANDS’ PURCHASING PRACTICES
DURING COVID-19 6 (2020) (reporting that 57% of garment businesses are either “somewhat likely” or
“extremely likely” to go out of business because of buyer practices).
4. Elizabeth L. Cline, Cancelling Fashion Orders: The Legal Rethink, VOGUE BUS. (Apr. 26, 2021),
https://www.voguebusiness.com/fashion/cancelling-fashion-orders-the-legal-rethink-sears-pay-up
[https://perma.cc/XR97-T9CW] (stating that Joseph Saracheck, a lawyer whose firm represents suppliers,
says that most of the apparel supply contracts he sees do not contain force majeure clauses).
5. Id.
6. David A. Hoffman & Cathy Hwang, The Social Cost of Contract, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 986–
91 (2021). Note that the authors discuss the “social cost” of enforcing contracts in changed contexts, such
as the pandemic; here, social cost refers to negative social impacts generated by the contract itself—even
without enforcement and under non-crisis conditions. Also, rather than focusing on costs for the public
at large, this Article focuses on a specific segment of the social-cost-of-contract-bearing public—workers.

DADUSH (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2022]

4/13/22 1:37 PM

PROSOCIAL CONTRACTS

155

The pandemic highlighted that extractive contracting is especially
problematic in times of crisis. Faced with widespread cancelations and
unilaterally modified payment terms that put their economic survival in jeopardy,
suppliers tried different, mostly informal, tactics to preserve their contracts with
buyers. They pleaded with buyers not to suspend or cancel orders and to pay for
completed orders.7 Some suppliers even turned to U.S. courts for help: twentysix Bangladeshi garment manufacturers sued the U.S. company Sears for breach
of contract, alleging failure to pay for millions of dollars’ worth of canceled
orders.8 The details are confidential, but the suit yielded a settlement awarding
suppliers a portion of the money owed, indicating that they had the better legal
argument.9 Such offensive action by suppliers is extraordinarily rare in the
apparel context where there is hesitancy to go after non-performing buyers for
fear of being perceived as troublemakers and losing future contracts to
competitors. Besides reputational barriers, recourse through litigation may also
be inaccessible to suppliers due to cost, lack of legal capacity, and other logistical
and jurisdictional hurdles. For these reasons, the likelihood of suppliers enforcing
supply contracts is generally close to nil. The Sears lawsuit was therefore more
indicative of suppliers’ desperation than their litigiousness or legal prowess.10
How contracting parties behave with one another when prospects for legal
enforcement are dim brings relational contract theory into play.11 Had a
relational contract theorist been asked to predict how brands would behave in
the context of an event like the pandemic, they likely would have correctly
predicted that brands would immediately cut and run and abandon their
suppliers. That is because, in the layman’s version of relational contract theory,
the real deal in apparel supply chain contracting is that buyers can do whatever
they want. Furthermore, because the real deal is bad, the paper deal is bad, too.12
7. Textile Excellence, BGMEA Pleads with Western Buyers to Not Cancel Orders, YOUTUBE
(Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oGbx-t1Y0ts [https://perma.cc/V8GA-FFW4]; see
also Brooke Bobb, This Hashtag Unlocked $15 Billion of Lost Wages Due to Cancelled Orders from Gap,
Levi’s, and Other Brands, VOGUE (July 10, 2020), https://www.vogue.com/article/remake-payupcampaign-social-media-garment-workers-wages-gap [https://perma.cc/P8P8-ULM5] (discussing the Pay
Up campaign).
8. Elizabeth L. Cline, Bangladesh Garment Makers Settle with Sears Over $40 Million in Canceled
Orders, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/elizabethlcline/2021/01/30/bangladeshgarment-makers-score—victory-against-sears-in-40-million-lawsuit/?sh=7fe3b0e2470d
[https://perma.cc/U6AD-JNDD].
9. Id.; see also Chris Remington, Sears Reaches US$6.3m Settlement in Bangladesh, ECOTEXTILE
NEWS (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.ecotextile.com/2021020127306/fashion-retail-news/sears-reaches-us-63m-settlement-in-bangladesh.html [https://perma.cc/4Y64-XQK8].
10. Reputational risks may have been somewhat lower in this case because Sears had filed for
bankruptcy.
11. The term “relational contracts” usually describes long-term, complex contractual exchanges
with repeated opportunities for performance, as distinct from discrete, one-off exchanges. It is also used
for contracts that are incomplete, meaning that there are aspects of the deal that are (often intentionally)
not spelled out in the writing. The parties effectively agree to address and fill in these gaps as they go. As
such, relational contracts are self-policing and may not require legal enforcement for the parties to adjust
their behavior.
12. Stewart Macaulay, The Real Deal and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships,
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Indeed, supply contracts tend not only to contain terms that are oppressively onesided and buyer-friendly, but they also tend to be used opportunistically by
buyers to justify unfair, selfish, and socially dangerous behavior.13
The question becomes, how do we improve the deal to achieve better
outcomes for workers? And what role can, and should, the written deal play in
supporting such improvement? In addressing these normatively, politically, and
morally charged questions, this Article goes beyond relational contract theory. It
offers prosocial contracts as a partial solution to the problem of protecting human
rights in global supply chains. With prosocial contracting, the parties shift from
an extractive model of engagement to one that is more intentionally relational
and socially beneficial. Here, relational refers to the quality of the buyer-supplier
contractual relationship,14 but also to how that relationship impacts stakeholders
who are not contract parties.15 Otherwise put, prosocial contracting is concerned
with improving the relationship between the parties, but also the relationship(s)
between the parties and contract stakeholders. Contract stakeholders are those
whose wellbeing is, in Iris Marion Young’s terminology, “socially connected” to
the contract.16 To achieve these relational objectives, prosocial contracting
operationalizes a shared-responsibility model whereby buyer and seller share
responsibility for the social performance of their contract. Indeed, a key
takeaway from this Article is that, to do any real good, both for human rights and
for social compliance, corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) must be
reconceived as shared social responsibility.
The prosocial approach builds on the insights of Lisa Bernstein, who explains
that no contractual relationship stands alone and no single contract tells the
whole relational story. Rather, contracts contain and are imbedded within
networks of contractual and extra-contractual relationships that inform, shape,
and often regulate and govern one another.17 As such, contracts possess relational
Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules, 66 MOD. L. REV. 44, 44 (2003).
13. See, e.g., FARCE MAJEURE, supra note 1 (explaining the negative social impacts of oppressive
contracting practices before and during the pandemic); John F. Sherman III, Irresponsible Exit:
Exercising Force Majeure Provisions in Procurement Contracts, 6 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 127, 128–29 (2020)
(explaining that the company Kohl’s canceled its contracts and a week later paid its shareholders a $109
million dividend).
14. Is it, for example, respectful, honest, cooperative, fair, trusting, enduring? These qualities echo
the “six principles” of “formal relational contracting” developed by David Frydlinger, Oliver Hart, and
Kate Vitasek in A New Approach to Contracts, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 2019. The key difference
between formal relational contracting and prosocial contracting is that the latter extends relational
principles to extra-contractual relationships with non-party stakeholders.
15. The UNGPs define “affected stakeholder” as “an individual whose human rights have been
affected by enterprise’s operations, products or services.” U.N. GLOB. COMPACT NETWORK GER. &
TWENTYFIFTY, STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE: A BUSINESS
GUIDE 12 (2014).
16. Iris Marion Young, Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model, 23 SOC. PHIL.
& POL’Y 102, 105 (2006).
17. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network
Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561 (2015) (describing the contractual and
extra-contractual governance mechanisms operating among mid-western original equipment
manufacturers); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
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powers that can extend beyond the parties to reach, for example, workers and
their communities. They do more than simply set out the terms of a single deal
or transaction. They contain, express, and enshrine relational values. They can,
therefore, be upgraded to contain better, fairer, more prosocial relational values.
This Article explains why companies should seriously consider upgrading to
prosocial contracts now, not only because it is the right thing to do, but also
because the legal, business, and reputational cases for doing so are becoming
stronger by the day. Part II explains how contracts’ regulatory and expressive
powers can be harnessed to improve the social performance of international
supply chains. Part III shows how extractive contracts not only aggravate human
rights risks, but also undermine firms’ own commitments to maintaining clean
supply chains. Part IV analyzes how extractive contracting could soon become a
source of increased legal risk for firms transacting internationally, particularly
given recent human rights due diligence (“HRDD”) legislation coming from
Europe. This legislation, combined with the twin rise of Environmental, Social,
and Governance (“ESG”) investing and conscious consumerism worldwide, and
the increased use by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) of Withhold
Release Orders (“WROs”) to seize tainted goods at the U.S. border, signals a
tidal shift in the case for transitioning to prosocial contracting. Lastly, Part V
offers practical guidance for prosocial contracting using the Model Contract
Clauses to Protect Human Rights in International Supply Chains (“MCCs”)
developed by an ABA Business Law Section Working Group.18
II
THE REGULATORY AND EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF CONTRACT
Contracts are potentially powerful instruments for effecting social change
internationally.19 While national law is restricted in its ability to regulate
corporate misconduct overseas, international law, which does cross borders,
applies primarily to regulate the conduct of governments, not corporations. On
the other hand, soft law instruments, such as the United Nations Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (“UNGPs”) or the Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development Guidance on Responsible Business
Conduct (“OECD Guidance”), which do apply to corporations, are not legally
enforceable. Although HRDD legislation aims to bridge it, there continues to be
a very large governance gap with respect to policing the social performance of
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) (describing the private legal
system governing the cotton trade); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (describing the private
legal system governing the diamond trade).
18. David V. Snyder, Susan Maslow & Sarah Dadush, Balancing Buyer and Supplier
Responsibilities: Model Contract Clauses to Protect Workers in International Supply Chains, Version 2.0,
77 BUS. L. 115 (forthcoming Winter 2021–2022).
19. The promise and limitations of using contracts to achieve better social outcomes is increasingly
being explored in legal scholarship by authors such as Aditi Bagchi, Kevin Davis, Jonathan Lipson, Trang
Nguyen, Kish Parella, John Sherman, David Snyder, and myself.
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transnational corporations.
Against this backdrop, contracts offer a promising additional avenue for
improving human rights in supply chains thanks to their hybrid nature. Contracts
are a hybrid in that they operate at the intersection of soft and hard law. Although
contractual commitments are voluntary at the outset, once made, they become
legally binding and enforceable. Contracts can thus be understood—and
deployed—as vessels for transporting voluntary but enforceable norms across
borders. In this way, contracts can do what neither soft nor hard law does: directly
regulate the conduct of private actors transacting internationally. In principle,
then, contracts can address the multi-layered challenges of jurisdiction, scope,
and enforceability in one fell swoop. This, in a nutshell, is contracts’ regulatory
superpower.
Contracts have expressive power, as well. They communicate and enshrine
different social values and principles of engagement.20 For example, a contract
could express extractive values, or prosocial values, or some combination.21 Many
types of contracts—including international supply contracts—operate on zerosum principles of engagement: The more you get, the less I get, and, since more
is better, I need to get as much as possible, and you need to get as little as possible;
likewise, the more risks and obligations you take on, and the fewer I take on, the
better. Zero-sum contracting instructs the parties to treat one another as
adversaries, engaged in competition rather than a common endeavor. It keeps
the parties singularly focused on their own interests and limits their incentives to
consider—and perhaps even their ability to comprehend—the impacts of their
decisions on contract stakeholders. This discourages cooperation, trust, and
transparency between the parties, and instead encourages secrecy and deception.
For example, as explained in Contracting for Human Rights, a garment supplier
concerned with keeping the contract might conceal that it is having difficulty
meeting the production timeline or that, to meet buyer’s requirements, it
subcontracted to another factory with lower human rights standards.22 Otherwise
put, when there is a culture of distrust-cum-fear between the parties, zero-sum
contracts can aggravate human rights risks by pushing bad practices deeper into

20. Jonathan C. Lipson, Promising Justice: Contract (As) Social Responsibility, 2019 WIS. L. REV.
1109, 1151–52 (2019) (explaining that although “[t]he literature on [legal] expressivism is largely foreign
to the world of contract,” contracts may in fact create “more absolute expression than any other type of
legal instrument”).
21. See generally HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS
(2017) (explaining that the parties can choose what values to enshrine and promote in their contract). See
also Lynn Stout, Picking Prosocial Partners: The Story of Relational Contract, in CULTIVATING
CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 194 (2010) (explaining that law can “serve an
expressive function and change human behavior simply by sending authoritative messages about what
sorts of values and behaviors are appropriate.”); Erin Ann O’Hara, Trustworthiness and Contract, in
MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 186 (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008)
(“Contract law serves a type of expressive function by communicating to tradesmen that certain
standards of decency will be required of their conduct.”).
22. Sarah Dadush, Contracting for Human Rights: Looking to Version 2.0 of the ABA Model
Contract Clauses, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1519, 1534–46 (2019).
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the supply chain shadows.
Zero-sum contracting is not only common in commercial spheres, but also it
is how transactional lawyers are taught to represent their clients’ interests.
Indeed, it is a measure of a lawyer’s skill to negotiate grossly lopsided deals, so
long as the lopsidedness favors their client. Although zero-sum contracts are not
problematic per se, they can become extractive if there are serious power
disparities between the parties that the stronger party unfairly exploits without
sufficient consideration for the social implications. In such circumstances—
common in apparel supply chains—zero-sum contracts can quickly go from being
commercially sensible and advantageous to being extractive, irresponsible, and
socially dangerous.
On the other hand, contracts that express prosocial values, such as mutual
respect, cooperation, shared responsibility, reciprocity, trust, and loyalty can
promote healthier, fairer dynamics between the parties. And, because prosocial
contracting loosens the shackles of adversarial and defensive self-interest, it
creates openings for the parties to consider both the economic and the social
aspects of their deal. This, in turn, brings contract stakeholder interests into view
and encourages the parties to consider the social—as well as commercial—
impacts of their decisions.
1.

Prosocial Distinctions

As a point of clarification, prosociality should not be confused with altruism.
Prosocial psychology expert, Hans Bierhoff, explains that “prosocial behavior is
often based on a mixture of more selfish (egoistic) and more selfless (altruistic)
motivations.”23 Thus, “prosocial responses need not be without personal gain.”24
In other words, firms need not give up financial gain—or become charitable, nonprofit organizations—to engage in prosocial contracting. They can do both. Firms
could, as some say in the corporate governance context, adopt a “blended
value”25 or a triple bottom-line (profit, people, and planet) approach to
contracting. Recognizing that contracts can generate commercial, social, and
environmental value––or costs––firms could enlist their contracts as allies to
increase each type of value. Proceeding this way, firms could increase their
financial and their social or environmental returns, while simultaneously
reducing their legal and reputational risk.
Indeed, when it comes to managing human rights risks, extractive contracts
are simply not fit for purpose. Rather than reduce human rights risks, extractive
contracts tend to exacerbate them. On the other hand, contracts that express and
operationalize prosocial values and establish processes for collaboration and risksharing can do much more to manage-by-reducing human rights risks. Thus, one
23. Hans W. Bierhoff, Prosocial Behavior, in INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: A
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 179 (Miles Hewstone et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007).
24. Id. at 180.
25. See generally Jed Emerson, The Blended Value Proposition: Integrating Social and Financial
Returns, 45 CAL. MGMT. REV. 35 (2003) (explaining the blended value proposition).
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should not assume that prosocial contracting has only soft, or moral benefits; it
also has commercial and legal benefits.
Prosocial contracts are a good example of what Jonathan Lipson calls “the
use of contract to achieve social responsibility,” or “KSR.”26 However, a key
distinction is that prosocial contracts add a shared-responsibility requirement to
the KSR analysis. As explained further below, unilateral approaches to
responsibility whereby only the party who can directly inflict human harm bears
responsibility for avoiding and remedying that harm are not only inadequate, but
also dangerous. In the supply contract context, both parties, buyer and seller,
must share responsibility for the social performance of their deal. The prosocial
model would therefore reject KSR initiatives that create social obligations
applicable only to one party.
Shared responsibility is a core principle of prosocial contracting, which is
deeply inspired by the work of the late political philosopher, Iris Marion Young.
Young persuasively argued that a crucial defect of the traditional “liability
model” of responsibility is that it exonerates actors who do not directly cause
human harm, even when they actively participate in the processes that create
injustice:
where there is structural social injustice, a liability model is not sufficient for assigning
responsibility. The liability model relies on a fairly direct interaction between the
wrongdoer and the wronged party. Where structural social processes constrain and
enable many actors in complex relations, however, those with the greatest power in the
system, or those who derive benefits from its operations, may well be removed from any
interaction with those who are most harmed in it. While it is usually inappropriate to
blame those agents who are connected to but removed from the harm, it is also
inappropriate, I suggest, to allow them (us) to say that they (we) have nothing to do
with it. Thus, I suggest that we need a different conception of responsibility to refer to
the obligations that agents who participate in structural social processes with unjust
outcomes have. I call this a social connection model.27

For Young, responsibility for (in)justice is always, necessarily shared. With
international supply chains and manufacturing processes being as complex as
they are, it is neither realistic, nor fair, nor effective to single out one bad actor
for responsibility. From producers, to retailers, to consumers, to investors, to
everyone and every entity in between, our decisions and actions are threads
woven into a vast responsibility tapestry. Dissatisfaction with the liability model
is also reflected in the UNGPs, which, as discussed below, say that all businesses
should avoid not only “causing,” but also “contributing” to adverse impacts.
Prosocial contracts seek to operationalize the shared-responsibility principles
enshrined in the social connection model and the UNGPs contractually.
As a last point of distinction, prosocial contracts also bear similarity to
“Formal Relational Contracts” (“FRK”), a term coined by Kate Vitasek, David
Frydlinger, and Oliver Hart to designate contracts that are “[d]esigned from the
outset to foster trust and collaboration” between the parties.28 Their research
26. Lipson, supra note 20, at 1116–32. “K” is the widely used shorthand for “contract.”
27. Id. at 118.
28. Frydlinger et al., supra note 14.
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suggests that there are economic gains to be had from pursuing a “vested
methodology” for contracting “that establishes a ‘what’s in it for we’ partnership
mentality” wherein “the parties have a vested interest in each other’s success.”29
They explain that FRKs are particularly appropriate for contracts that involve
repeated opportunities for performance, such as supply contracts.
While prosocial contracts do seek to improve the buyer-supplier relationship,
they go beyond FRKs in that they also seek to improve the contract’s social
performance. In this sense, prosocial contracts are like FRKs-plus because they
expand the relational lens to include non-party, contract stakeholder interests.
Additionally, FRKs are not well-suited to address situations where there are
stark power disparities between the parties—as is often true in apparel—or
where the contract stakeholders are particularly vulnerable—as is often true for
garment workers. By contrast, prosocial contracts expressly take such disparities
and vulnerabilities into account in contractualizing social responsibility. Under
the prosocial model, the parties would systematically consider the social impacts
of their deal at each stage of their contractual relationship, including termination.
And, if a human rights harm occurs, both parties would provide remedy to the
adversely affected stakeholders in proportion to their contribution to the harm—
something not at all contemplated by FRKs. Perhaps one way to conceptualize
prosocial contracts is as a hybrid of KSR and FRKs. With this conceptual
background set out, the next Part examines the various ways in which extractive
contracting is problematic for human rights.
III
THE PROBLEM(S) OF EXTRACTIVE CONTRACTING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Commercial relationships in apparel supply chains are plagued with
inequality, asymmetry, and disfunction. The pandemic underscored the
unfairness that permeates buyer-supplier relationships and its effects on nonparty stakeholders—garment workers and their communities. But extractive
dynamics existed long before anyone had ever heard of COVID-19.
Apparel manufacturing is labor intensive but not particularly skills intensive.
Consequently, the costs for buyers to switch suppliers are relatively low. Contract
price becomes the main competitive advantage that one supplier has over
another. The supplier that offers (or takes) the lowest price wins, even when that
price is insufficient to cover the costs of production, including labor. This intense
price-driven competition creates a race to the bottom for human rights. In
relational contract terminology, the real deal is that buyers run the show, while
suppliers are under such intense competitive pressure to get and keep the deal
that their freedom of contract is shallow at best.
These extractive relational dynamics translate into the paper deal.30 Apparel
29. Id.
30. I deliberately do not use “contracts of adhesion” or “unconscionable” because, although some
supply contracts could be found to be illegally oppressive, the concern here is less with the legality of
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supply contracts tend to be excessively one-sided and buyer-friendly. They are
often negotiated, drafted, performed, and terminated in ways that are egregiously
advantageous for buyers and disadvantageous for suppliers. Such lopsidedness is
dangerous for garment workers because it is they who ultimately bear the social
costs associated with commercial “squeezing.”31 This makes sense: suppliers
pressed to produce as many garments as possible, as quickly as possible, for as
little money as possible, are likely to pass that strain onto their workers. This
certainly does not justify supplier-level abuses of workers’ human rights, but it
does offer an explanation for those abuses that is often overlooked: buyers’
irresponsible purchasing practices.
Irresponsible purchasing practices that can negatively impact social
performance include: imposing prices that cannot possibly cover production
costs, let alone the costs of socially responsible production; requiring too-short
turnaround times for manufacturing and delivery; poorly forecasting
requirements and making last-minute changes to orders; making late payments;
and, exiting the contract in a cut and run fashion, without giving the supplier
adequate notice, paying for outstanding invoices, or taking measures to mitigate
the social impacts of termination.32 Such practices intensify commercial pressures
on suppliers, making it harder for them to meet buyers’ own human rights
standards. Under such circumstances, suppliers become more likely to squeeze
their workers by suppressing wages, requiring excessive or illegal overtime,
cutting corners on safety and sanitation, or engaging in union busting.33 Viewed
in this light, the line between commercial abuse and human abuse becomes
vanishingly thin.
Perhaps counterintuitively, another aspect of extraction involves the
inclusion of social terms in supply contracts. Social terms are contract terms that
pertain specifically to social performance—workers’ human rights, health, and
safety. They expand the contractual lens to bring contract stakeholders into view.
They are distinct from commercial terms, such as price, payment terms, delivery
timelines, etc. They are also distinct from order-specific terms, such as quantity,
material, design, etc. While commercial and order-specific terms inform the
parties’ obligations to one another, social terms inform the parties’ obligations to
others beyond the contract—people and planet. Social terms can be included in
the contract either as contractual clauses or as codes of conduct or human rights
policies incorporated by reference.
It is not uncommon for fashion brands to include social terms in their supply
contracts since doing so is a relatively straightforward way to respond to public—
extractive terms and practices than their (un)fairness, and the implications of that unfairness for social
performance.
31. RE:STRUCTURE LAB, supra note 2, at 14 (“Even where supply chains are ethically certified,
cutthroat purchasing practices make it impossible for suppliers to meet relevant social standards.”);
FARCE MAJEURE, supra note 1, at 2–3; Anner, supra note 1, at 81.
32. Anner, supra note 1, at 81; FARCE MAJEURE, supra note 1, at 1; ETHICAL TRADING
INITIATIVE, ANNUAL IMPACT REPORT (2020).
33. FARCE MAJEURE, supra note 1, at 3.
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especially consumer and investor—concerns about, for example, the use of
sweatshops or forced or child labor in the supply chain.34 Contractualizing social
commitments allows brands to say that they are taking measures to maintain
clean supply chains while reducing their exposure to reputational and legal risk,
at least in theory. This is only in theory because not all social terms are created
equal. Well-conceived social terms can certainly support the successful
implementation of companies’ risk management strategies. However, if the terms
are designed primarily to protect the company—not human rights—they may
undermine the risk management strategy, defeating the very purpose they set out
to achieve. Otherwise put, social terms whose chief purpose is to mitigate
companies’ legal and reputational risk rather than human rights risks tend to
increase risk all around—for workers, buyers, and suppliers.
To be effective, social terms must address the root causes of negative social
performance, and, as noted, not all root causes lie with suppliers. Buyers’
irresponsible purchasing practices are an important source of human rights
trouble. Therefore, for social terms to do good risk-management work, it is
essential for parties to share responsibility for the social performance of their
contract. This is a very different tack from the one that buyers’ lawyers—
especially litigation-wary American lawyers—would typically take, which is to
place all the legal risks associated with human rights onto suppliers’ side of the
contractual balance sheet.
Unless anchored in shared-responsibility principles, social terms that
ostensibly serve to uphold human rights can turn out to be dangerously
extractive. To understand this, consider that buyers generally offer very little, if
any support to suppliers in meeting buyers’ own human rights standards. Yet,
meeting standards can increase suppliers’ production costs and further compress
profit margins, especially for suppliers with multiple buyers, each with different
standards. Cost pressures in turn incentivize suppliers to engage in problematic
behavior such as (mis)representing that they meet buyer’s standards even when
they do not, engaging in potentially dangerous sub-contracting to access cheaper
labor, concealing human rights issues that arise, or cutting back on workplace
safety expenditures. All of this aggravates human rights risks, and, by extension,
company risk.
When social terms are included in contracts, they typically only bind
suppliers—not buyers. This means that only supplier is contractually obligated to
uphold human rights and only supplier can be in breach if rights are violated.35
Such unilateralism is rooted in the common, but mistaken, assumption that
because human harms occur at the manufacturer level, only supplier is

34. See generally FASHION REVOLUTION, FASHION TRANSPARENCY INDEX (2021),
https://www.fashionrevolution.org/about/transparency/ [https://perma.cc/BYH5-FH5P] (firms subject to
the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act or to any of the various Modern Slavery Acts may also
be inclined to contractualize social terms).
35. See generally Dadush, supra note 22 (discussing the dangers of ignoring the buyer piece of the
human rights problem and imposing contractual liability only on suppliers).
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blameworthy if something bad happens. It follows that only supplier needs to be
regulated contractually. But, as explained, the notion that there are no bad
buyers—just bad suppliers—is false. How buyers behave, particularly their
purchasing practices, matters a great deal for the social performance of supply
chains.36 Thus, unilateral social terms are problematic because they miss a crucial
piece of the human rights in supply chains problem—the buyer piece—in a way
that tends to aggravate human rights risks.
When buyers engage in irresponsible practices, they can actively—if not
intentionally—interfere with suppliers’ performance of the social terms,
potentially pushing suppliers into a social breach of contract that puts workers’
human rights at risk.37 When buyer interference is connected to a social breach in
this way, buyers can fairly be described as having contributed to the breach—and
to any resulting human harm—even if they did not directly ‘commit’ the breach.
In such instances, buyer and supplier should be viewed as co-breachers and
responsibility for remedying the breach should be fairly-apportioned between
them.
Specifically, when a buyer contributes to a social breach through irresponsible
purchasing practices, it should participate in providing remedy to victims in
proportion to its contribution. This remedies-outcome differs substantially from
the one generated by the conventional liability model where remedies would flow
between the parties, not to the non-party victims of the social breach. Take the
example of money damages: following a breach by supplier, either supplier would
pay damages to buyer as compensation or, less likely, the damages owed by
supplier would be reduced in proportion to buyer’s contribution to the breach.38
Neither formula is suitable for addressing social breaches that result in human
harms to workers. Social breaches that harm workers should be addressed by
directing remedies to the victims—not the other party.
Allowing buyers to be compensated for harms suffered by workers is not only
grossly extractive, but also it fails to make anyone properly whole. Buyers may
have already received the economic benefit of the bargain by the time a social
breach is discovered, so compensating them for the breach, on top of the value of
the goods, would constitute a form of unjust enrichment. Meanwhile, traditional
inter-party remedies would fail to make whole those harmed by the social
breach—the workers. To avoid this injustice, when a social breach results in

36. See generally BETTER BUYING INST., BETTER BUYING: GUIDELINES FOR “BETTER”
PURCHASING PRACTICES AMIDST THE CORONAVIRUS CRISIS AND RECOVERY (2020) (drawing lessons
from the COVID-19 pandemic to suggest improvements to purchasing practices); FARCE MAJEURE,
supra note 1; ANNER, supra note 3; ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, supra note 32.
37. The term “social breach” refers to breaches that arise from non-performance of social terms.
Like any breach, social breaches are breaches of the entire contract.
38. See Ariel Porat, A Comparative Fault Defense in Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1397, 1399
(2009) (“Prevailing contract law would take a binary approach to such situations: either A or B would
shoulder any losses due to nonperformance in their entirety. The choice between the two alternatives
would hinge on the interpretation of the contract. Courts rarely opt for an intermediate solution that
apportions damages between the parties.”).
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human harms, both parties should provide remediation to the victims in
proportion to their contribution to the breach. This is the remedies-outcome that
prosocial contracts would seek to ensure.
In sum, even social terms can be extractive. Particularly in the intensely
competitive context of apparel manufacturing where there are serious power
disparities between buyers and suppliers, unilateral-responsibility models can
generate precisely the types of negative social costs that social terms seek to
avoid.39 Without parallel obligations for buyers to uphold human rights, engage
in responsible purchasing practices, and participate in human rights remediation
if they contribute to a social breach, the contract can turn on itself and undermine
its own social terms.40
The phenomenon of companies committing to improving human rights but
undermining their own efforts through their contracts perfectly illustrates the
“coherence gap.”41 The coherence gap refers to the disconnect between firms’—
public or institutional—commitments to improve their social (and
environmental) performance and their legal and operational practices in relation
to those commitments. As discussed, when firms behave poorly behind the closed
doors of their contracts, they compromise their own ability to achieve positive
social performance. Lack of coherence between what a company communicates
about its values and social commitments to consumers, investors, and employees
and how it actually lives those values in its private, legal and operational life
presents several problems. It presents a social performance problem because
when companies fail to align their practices with their social commitments,
human rights can suffer. It presents an institutional effectiveness problem
because it creates tension between the firm’s social policies and its legal and
operational practices, compromising the integrity and success of the policy
implementation process. Lastly, when a firm publicly commits to improving its
social performance but fails to make the institutional changes necessary to meet
those commitments, engaging instead in behavior that undercuts those
39. To be clear, advocating for shared responsibility is not the same as saying that there are no bad
suppliers. On the contrary, the idea is to increase responsibility for socially costly behavior across the
board.
40. This gives rise to fascinating contract law questions: When a contract is set up to fail by its own
terms, can contract law help? More specifically, what can courts do when they find that a contract
undermines the very purpose it set out to achieve? The short answer is, not much. The law should do
more in situations involving social breaches, where the set-up-to-fail terms pertain not to economic
matters, but to human rights. In Other People’s Contracts, Aditi Bagchi zooms in on this issue, explaining
that there is “little attention given to the externalities produced by joint action through contract.” 32 YALE
J. REGUL. 211, 240 (2015) (emphasis added). In such cases, she argues, it may make sense to use contract
law as an externality-reducing vehicle. Specifically, she proposes that when a contract contains an
ambiguous term, the court should favor the interpretation that “generates fewer negative externalities.”
Id. at 242. I would go further and recommend that contracts with social terms be interpreted to contain
an obligation for buyers not to interfere with suppliers’ social performance through irresponsible
purchasing practices. In other words, contracts with—even unambiguous—social terms should be
interpreted prosocially.
41. Olivia Windham Stewart & Sarah Dadush, Sharing Responsibility for Human Rights in
Contracts, BLOOMBERG L., PROFESSIONAL PERSPECTIVES 2–3 (2021).
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commitments, the coherence gap potentially presents a “greenwashing” or
“fairwashing” problem by creating a false impression of the company’s
goodness.42 Until now, the coherence gap has not presented a legal problem for
firms. As the next Part discusses, however, that may be changing.
IV
THE PROBLEM OF EXTRACTIVE CONTRACTING FOR LEGAL COMPLIANCE
Extractive contracts formalize and widen the coherence gap, baking it into
the DNA of supply chain relations. Companies that include social terms in their
contracts can truthfully say they are taking measures to protect human rights in
their supply chains, while continuing to engage in commercial practices that
endanger human rights. Until now, such deficiencies have been relatively costless
for buyer-firms, at least legally. But change is underway thanks to recent
legislative developments coming from the European Union (“E.U.”).
On February 23, 2022, the European Commission published a Proposal for a
Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence (“the Draft Directive” or
“Directive”).43 Although not yet finalized, the Draft Directive is an advanced
version of text that will eventually become hard law, applying to all E.U. Member
States. When it becomes law, the Directive will create an enforceable legal
requirement for companies—E.U. and non-E.U.—of a certain size and revenue,
to carry out human rights and environmental due diligence in their supply
chains.44 Since this Article focuses on human rights, it will only discuss the HRDD
aspect of the legislation, not the environmental aspect.
To meet their HRDD obligations under the Directive, companies will be
required to (1) integrate due diligence into their policies; (2) identify actual or
potential adverse human rights impacts; (3) prevent and mitigate potential
adverse impacts, and bring actual adverse impacts to an end and minimize their
extent; (4) establish and maintain a complaints procedure; (5) monitor their due
diligence strategy for effectiveness; and, (6) publicly communicate on due
diligence.45 These requirements effectively transpose the HRDD standards set
out in the UNGPs and the OECD Guidance into hard law.
To fully grasp the potential for HRDD legislation to fundamentally shift the
corporate liability landscape, one must understand that the UNGPs and the
OECD Guidance serve as something akin to founding documents for the new
42. Although related to greenwashing (and fairwashing), the coherence gap is more inward-looking
and focused on how the firm’s institutional practices can support—or undermine—its goodness claims.
Additionally, while greenwashing is often associated with trickery and deception, the same is not
necessarily true about the coherence gap. A coherence gap could exist without greenwashing, and viceversa. A firm could be entirely sincere about wanting to achieve positive social outcomes and still suffer
from a coherence gap if its contracts stymie progress.
43. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Corporate
Sustainability Due Diligence and Amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937, COM (2022) 71 final (Feb. 23,
2022) [hereinafter EU Directive].
44. Id. art. 2, at 46.
45. Id. art. 4, at 53.
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regime and, more specifically, that these instruments enshrine shared
responsibility as a core principle for upholding human rights in supply chains.
This Part finds that the extractive contracting practices described above would
likely be viewed as non-compliant with the UNGPs and with the E.U. Directive.
Unanimously endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011, the
UNGPs are a profoundly influential soft law instrument comprising thirty-one
Guiding Principles (“GPs”) on business and human rights.46 The UNGPs fall
under three pillars: Pillar I addresses nation states’ “Duty to Protect” human
rights; Pillar II addresses businesses’ “Responsibility to Respect” human rights;
and Pillar III on “Access to Remedy” outlines nation states’ and businesses’
obligation to ensure that victims have access to remedy.47 For present purposes,
Pillar II is of greatest relevance because it details what businesses are and are not
responsible for with respect to human rights.
Crucially, GP13 says that “businesses are responsible, not just for harms they
directly cause, but also for harms to which they contribute”:48
The responsibility to respect human rights requires that business enterprises . . . [a]void
causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own
activities, and address such impacts when they occur . . . .49

Since it is unlikely that a fashion brand would directly cause human rights
harms—harms are more likely caused by suppliers or sub-suppliers—the
contribution aspect is most significant because it is broad enough to encompass
behavior such as irresponsible purchasing practices and extractive contracting.
Indeed, the UN’s Interpretive Guide on The Corporate Responsibility to Protect
Human Rights offers this example of how a business might contribute to adverse
human rights impacts: “Changing product requirements for suppliers at the
eleventh hour without adjusting production deadlines and prices, thus pushing
suppliers to breach labour standards in order to deliver.”50 Similarly, Shift, an
organization that describes itself as “the leading center of expertise on the
[UNGPs]”51 uses this example: “Companies may contribute to negative impacts,
for example if their purchasing practices incentivize suppliers to force workers
into unpaid overtime to meet contract requirements.”52
These examples strongly suggest that when buyers engage in practices that
push suppliers to commit social breaches and interfere with suppliers’ ability to
discharge their social obligations—set out contractually or in national labor

46. See U.N. HUM. RTS., GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2011)
[hereinafter UNGPs].
47. Id. at iii.
48. Id. at 14.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. U.N. HUM. RTS., THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS: AN
INTERPRETIVE GUIDE 17 (2012).
51. Who We Are, SHIFT, https://shiftproject.org/who-we-are/ [https://perma.cc/KP8G-P2N4] (Apr.
1, 2022).
https://shiftproject.org/resources/ungps101/
52. UN
Guiding
Principles
101,
SHIFT,
[https://perma.cc/35RU-X7DC] (Apr. 1, 2022).
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laws—buyers contribute to adverse impacts. Put differently, extractive
contracting would likely be viewed as a source of UNGP non-compliance. It is
hard to overstate the significance of the contribution prong of UNGPresponsibility. It opens an entirely new area of corporate accountability by
bringing indirectly harmful conduct into the frame. As GP13 becomes hardened
into law through the Directive, the prospects for holding businesses accountable
for extractive practices should improve substantially.
Another aspect of UNGP compliance that is relevant for contracting is that it
is both forward and backward-looking. Indeed, “adverse human rights impacts”
refers to actualized or existing harms, but also to potential harms: “Actual impact
is one that has occurred or is occurring. Potential impact is one that may occur
but has not yet done so.”53 Thus, responsibility kicks in at the risk prevention
stage, not just the after-the-bad-thing-has-happened stage. In our context, this
means that fashion companies should not only avoid sourcing from bad suppliers
with problematic human rights track records, but also negotiating, performing,
modifying, and terminating their contracts in ways that are likely to create or
aggravate human rights risks down the line. Thus, to be UNGP-compliant, buyers
should avoid engaging in extractive practices that could potentially lead to the
suppression of workers’ human rights.
Under the UNGPs, the principal way for businesses to avoid causing or
contributing to adverse impacts is to carry out robust HRDD. As reflected in the
Draft Directive, HRDD requires businesses to conduct human rights risk
assessments to identify risks that exist or may arise in their supply chains. But
HRDD asks companies to do more than simply collect risk-information.
Businesses must take affirmative measures—appropriate to the severity of the
risk at issue—to prevent it from materializing into actual harm. GP17 says:
In order to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their adverse
human rights impacts, business enterprises should carry out human rights due diligence.
The process should include assessing actual and potential human rights impacts,
integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and communicating how
impacts are addressed.54

Four aspects of HRDD deserve highlighting: First, HRDD is not a one and
done exercise; rather, it is an ongoing, dynamic process that businesses must
engage in for as long they are in business.55 Second, risk-identification is not the
end of HRDD, but a component of HRDD. Businesses must do something to
address the risks they identify through the assessment process. This makes
HRDD legislation—which transforms GP17 into hard law—fundamentally
different from simple disclosure laws like the California Transparency in Supply
Chains Act or the United Kingdom Modern Slavery Act. Third, HRDD
obligations extend to all the businesses involved in a supply chain. They all must
avoid causing, contributing, or being linked to adverse impacts. Should one

53. Id. at 15.
54. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 17–18.
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business fail to discharge its HRDD responsibilities, the burden for others would
not be lessened; on the contrary, they would be responsible for picking up the
slack. Fourth, HRDD includes risk prevention, mitigation, and victim-centered
remediation. GP13 says that businesses that caused or contributed to an adverse
impact must participate in providing remedy to affected stakeholders.56
Businesses that are only “linked” to the impact must use their leverage to ensure
that the businesses that caused or contributed to the impact provide remedy to
victims.57 Thus, ensuring access to remedy is also a matter of shared
responsibility. Here again, social terms that place the entire burden for
remedying social breaches on suppliers and do not channel remedies to victims
would likely be viewed as non-compliant.
1. Contracts and Human Rights Due Diligence
Contracts have a significant role to play in carrying out effective HRDD, both
under the UNGPs and the Draft Directive. Turning to the latter, contracts are
specifically mentioned in two key Articles: Article 7 on “Preventing adverse
impacts,” and Article 8 on “Bringing adverse impacts to an end.”58 To prevent
potential and end actual adverse impacts, businesses must “seek contractual
assurances from a business partner with whom it has a direct business relationship
that it will ensure compliance with the company’s code of conduct and, as
necessary, a prevention action plan” (for Article 7), or a “corrective action plan”
(for Article 8).59 Additionally, “[w]hen contractual assurances are obtained from,
or a contract is entered into, with [a small or medium sized enterprise], the terms
used shall be fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory.”60 Further, “[w]here
measures to verify compliance are carried out in relation to SMEs, the company
shall bear the cost of the independent third-party verification.”61
It is perhaps too early to say, since the Directive is not finalized, but the
current language does (a) explicitly recognize the role of contracts in HRDD,
both for purposes of preventing and remediating adverse impacts, and (b)
appears to identify unfair, unreasonable, and discriminatory contract terms as
inadequate for meeting the legal requirements laid out in Article 7 and Article 8.
This preliminary assessment suggests that extractive contracts could, potentially,
be a source of liability for companies subject to the E.U. law. This would make
sense given that the law is rooted in the UNGPs and the OECD Guidance.
Conversely, prosocial contracts that are fair, other-regarding, and that
operationalize shared-responsibility principles could potentially be a source of
legal compliance for firms subject to the new regime. If this initial assessment is
56. Id.
57. GP19(b)(ii) says that “[a]ppropriate action will vary according to” whether a business causes or
contributes to an adverse impact or is only linked to the impact and “[t]he extent of its leverage in
addressing the adverse impact.” Id. at 21.
58. EU Directive, supra note 43, at 55 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 55–56 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 55.
61. Id.
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correct, then this would be the perfect time for companies to start upgrading their
contracts to prosocial contracts.
Before getting too carried away, however, it must be noted that several civil
society organizations, including Shift, have expressed concern that the Draft
Directive puts too much emphasis on contracts and that it creates the possibility
that firms will be able to meet their legal HRDD requirements simply by
obtaining certain “contractual assurances” from suppliers.62 While my own view
is that this safe harbor concern is somewhat overblown, I absolutely agree that
companies should not be able to contract their HRDD obligations away.63 This is
why the European Commission’s guidance on model contractual clauses
contemplated in Article 12 will be so critical. 64 Hopefully it will establish, once
and for all, that responsibility for upholding human rights in supply chains is—
and must be—shared and that firms that attempt to contractually offload that
responsibility onto other, weaker actors down the chain will open themselves up
to, rather than shield themselves from, liability.
To sum up, shared-responsibility principles are core to HRDD under the
UNGPs and the Draft Directive. Fashion companies should therefore expect it
to become harder to avoid responsibility for adverse impacts to which they
contribute through their extractive purchasing and contracting practices. Legal
compliance could itself become a more holistic affair, with commercial behavior
being scrutinized not just through the narrow lens of corporate ownership or
contractual privity, but also relationally, looking at how business decisions
reverberate across the supply chain to impact human rights.
Before moving to the how-to of prosocial contracting, it is worth mentioning
recent developments in the United States. Although the United States does not
have HRDD legislation, businesses are not free to disregard the social
performance of their supply chains entirely. For instance, firms that wish to sell
goods in the United States must contemplate the possibility that tainted goods,
meaning goods that are believed to have been made with forced, trafficked, or
child labor, may be seized at the border by CBP through the issuance of a WRO.65
62. SHIFT, THE EU COMMISSION’S PROPOSAL FOR A CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY DUE
DILIGENCE DIRECTIVE: SHIFT’S ANALYSIS 5–6 (2022).
63
Addressing civil liability, Article 22 says that: “where a company has taken the actions referred to” in
Articles 7 and 8, “it shall not be liable for damages caused by an adverse impact arising as a result of the
activities of an indirect partner . . . unless it was unreasonable, in the circumstances of the case, to expect
that the action actually taken, including as regards verifying compliance, would be adequate to prevent,
mitigate, bring to an end or minimise the extent of the adverse impact.” EU Directive, supra note 43, at
59 (emphasis added). This language outlines a reasonableness standard that should warn firms against
making unreasonable use of their contracts to offload their HRDD responsibilities onto their suppliers
and sub-suppliers. Id..
64. Article 12 states that “to provide support to companies to facilitate their compliance” with
Articles 7 and 8, the European Commission “shall adopt guidance about voluntary model contract
clauses.” EU Directive, supra note 43, at 59.
65. President Obama revitalized this regulatory instrument by removing the consumptive demand
exemption in 2016. JONES DAY, COMBATING FORCED LABOR: THE INCREASED USE OF WITHHOLD
RELEASE ORDERS AND FORMAL FINDINGS 2 (2020); Sarah Carpenter, Global Forced Labor: U.S.
Government Continues Record-Setting Enforcement, ASSENT COMPLIANCE BLOG (Nov. 23, 2020),
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Such goods will only be released if the importer can prove that they maintain a
clean supply chain. If they are unable to prove this, they could suffer serious
financial losses. The CBP has expanded its use of WROs in recent years, signaling
a shift in U.S. regulators’ understanding of corporations’ responsibilities to
uphold human rights in their supply chains.
On the market regulation side, the twin-rise of conscious consumerism and
ESG investing in the United States and worldwide is creating strong incentives
for businesses to pay attention to their social (and environmental) performance,
alongside their financial performance. ESG investors may be dissolving the
boundaries between financial and non-financial performance by giving the “E”
and the “S” more weight in investment decisions and treating ESG factors as
material to financial performance.
The pandemic has pushed us, as members of a global community, to
fundamentally rethink how we understand responsibility—individual, corporate,
and contractual. In particular, the social performance of transnational
corporations is coming under greater scrutiny than ever before. The emergence
of HRDD legislation, alongside other developments, marks a sea-change in the
moral, legal, and business cases for transitioning to prosocial contracts. Young’s
social connection model and the UNGPs provide conceptual blueprints for
prosocial contracting, but neither offers concrete guidance on the content of
prosocial contracts. The next Part addresses this gap.
V
PROSOCIAL CONTRACTING IN PRACTICE
While shifting to prosocial contracting will not, on its own, solve the problem
of human rights in supply chains, it is a necessary part of the solution. For those
companies wanting to make the shift, however, there is a major educational
challenge involved. Buyer-firms, such as fashion brands and retailers, are not
accustomed to considering the social implications of their commercial practices,
let alone their contracting practices. They therefore tend to be ill-equipped to
take such implications into account contractually. In this regard, Version 2.0 of
the MCCs, published in 2021, provides helpful guidance.66 The MCCs are neither
perfect nor final—a Version 3.0 is already being contemplated. That said, they
represent a first attempt at translating the UNGPs into contractual obligations,
which matters because aligning supply contracts with the shared-responsibility
https://blog.assentcompliance.com/index.php/wro-enforcement-expands/
[https://perma.cc/7NCXH4PE] (“The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported in 2020 that the Forced Labor
Division conducted five times more investigations related to forced labor in 2018 to early 2020 than it
had in 2016–2017. Twelve WROs have been issued in 2020, up from seven in 2019 and just two in 2018.”)
(citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., FORCED LABOR IMPORTS: DHS INCREASED RESOURCES
AND ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS, BUT NEEDS TO IMPROVE WORKFORCE PLANNING AND MONITORING
(2020)).
66. See generally David V. Snyder et al., Balancing Buyer and Supplier Responsibilities: Model
Contract Clauses to Protect Workers in International Supply Chains, Version 2.0, 77 BUS. L. 115 (Winter
2021-22) (explaining the transition to version 2.0 of the MCCs and containing thirty-three new MCCs).
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principles enshrined in the UNGPs could help companies improve social
performance while simultaneously improving legal compliance.
The MCCs are modular, meaning that they can be selectively adopted and
adapted to fit different companies’ needs. For simplicity’s sake, the below
describes key aspects of a fully MCC-aligned supply contract, highlighting three
areas of prosocial innovation: The MCCs (1) commit both buyer and supplier to
engage in HRDD throughout their relationship and throughout their supply
chains—not just the first tier; (2) commit buyer to engage in responsible
purchasing practices and treat irresponsible practices that contribute to adverse
impacts—potential or actual—as a source of breach; and, (3) place victimcentered human rights remediation ahead of traditional contract remedies and
commit buyer to provide remedy in proportion to its contribution to the adverse
impact.67
What follows is a brief overview of the MCCs that best capture each of these
prosocial innovations:
1. HRDD
MCC 1.1 abandons the traditional model of supplier-only representations and
warranties of compliance with applicable human rights standards because such
representations “will often be untrue, and therefore routinely breached.”68
Instead, MCC 1.1 commits both parties to establish and maintain an HRDD
process (appropriate to their size and circumstances) to identify, prevent,
mitigate, and account for how they each address the impacts of their activities on
the human rights of individuals directly or indirectly affected by their supply
chains, consistent with the UNGPs.69
2. Buyer’s Commitment to Support Supplier Compliance with Schedule P
MCC 1.3 commits buyer to support—not interfere with—supplier’s
compliance with buyer’s human rights policy (for example, a supplier code of
conduct), referred to throughout the MCCs as “Schedule P.”70 Like MCC 1.1, this
MCC builds shared-responsibility into the contract and contains several subcommitments for buyer to:
• Engage in responsible purchasing practices.71
• Provide reasonable (technical and financial) assistance to supplier to
support compliance with Schedule P.
• Collaborate with supplier to agree on a contract price that that
accommodates costs associated with upholding responsible business
conduct.
67. Id. at 118.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. In addition to the MCCs, the Working Group also developed a model Responsible Purchasing
Code of Conduct, or “Buyer Code,” referred to as Schedule Q. See id.
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Consider the potential adverse impacts of making material changes to
the order and take measures to avoid or mitigate any adverse impacts
from order changes.
Excuse non-performance by supplier if supplier cannot perform
without causing or contributing to an adverse impact.
Consider the potential adverse impacts of termination and employ
commercially reasonable efforts to avoid or mitigate such impacts.
Buyer must exit the contract responsibly by providing reasonable
notice to supplier and paying for goods produced before
termination.72

3. Human Rights Remediation
MCC 2.3 says that, in the event of an un-remediated social breach by supplier,
buyer must––in cooperation with other buyers, where appropriate––require
supplier to prepare and implement a remediation plan, the purpose of which must
be to restore affected stakeholders to the situation they would have been in had
the adverse impact not occurred.73 Remediation must be proportionate to the
adverse impact and may include apologies, restitution, rehabilitation, financial
and non-financial compensation, and preventive measures to avoid the reoccurrence of harm.74 Furthermore, supplier must provide evidence to show that
it has consulted with affected stakeholders, both in preparing the remediation
plan and in assessing its implementation.75
If buyer causes or—more likely—contributes to an adverse impact by failing
to meet its commitments under MCC 1.3, then buyer must participate in
preparing and implementing the remediation plan, including by providing
capacity-building, technical, or financial assistance, in proportion to its
contribution.76 In line with the UNGPs, the MCCs place victim-centered human
rights remediation ahead of traditional Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
remedies, such as rejecting or revoking acceptance of non-conforming goods and
expectation damages. Furthermore, where buyer can access UCC remedies, these
will be limited in proportion to buyer’s contribution to the adverse impact(s).
A last noteworthy aspect of MCC-aligned contracts is found in MCC 6.3,
which deals with damages. It contractualizes the principle that the parties should
not profit from social breaches:
Neither Buyer nor Supplier should benefit from a Schedule P violation or any human
rights violation occurring in relation to this Agreement. If damages are owed that would
result in a benefit to Buyer or Supplier, such amounts should go toward supporting the
remediation processes set out in Section 1.4 and Article 2. A ‘benefit’ is here understood

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 135–37.
Id. at 139.
Id.
Id. at 139–40.
Id. at 141.
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to mean being put in a better position than if this Agreement had been performed
without a Schedule P Breach.77

This brief overview of the MCCs provides a flavor for how prosocial contracting,
rooted in shared-responsibility principles, could look in practice. Again, the
MCCs are not perfect, but they offer a helpful guide for enlisting a firm’s supply
contracts as allies in improving the social performance of their supply chain.
A closing note on enforcement is called for. As discussed, the likelihood that
a supplier would sue a buyer for breach, particularly a social breach, is very low.
The likelihood that a buyer would sue—versus simply terminate—a supplier for
a social breach is similarly very low. This does not mean, however, that prosocial
contracts such as those incorporating the MCCs would be useless. As Lipson
explains, even unlikely-to-be-enforced KSR terms can serve a positive social
function.78 Specifically, they can teach the parties to change how they approach
and, more importantly, use their contracts to achieve better social performance
and better compliance. Indeed, prosocial contracting purposefully raises the
status of the contract from that of a mere transactional document to something
akin to a relational operating manual that the parties can consult throughout their
engagement—not just when things go wrong. It can help bridge the coherence
gap by institutionalizing contractual processes designed to facilitate cooperation,
reduce secrecy, and improve social performance—all without the ‘threat’ of
enforcement.79 In fact, rather than view low enforcement prospects as a weakness
of prosocial contracting, one could view this as an opportunity: why not explore
upgrading to prosocial contracting since it can bring significant benefits—
improved cooperation and efficiency, better social outcomes, and legal
compliance—without significantly increasing contractual liability? Furthermore,
given that HRDD legislation may close the contractual enforcement gap in the
years to come, this seems like an especially good time to engage in prosocial
explorations, particularly in a domain that firms have dominion over—their
contracts.
VI
CONCLUSION
The pandemic did not create the extractive relational dynamics at play in the
apparel sector; those existed long before anyone had heard of COVID-19. It did,
however, expose the toxicity of these dynamics, revealing the vanishingly thin
line between commercial abuse and human abuse. The future undoubtedly holds
77. Id. at 146–47.
78. Lipson, supra note 20, at 1151–55 (“[E]ven if KSR terms fail in a conventional sense, they are
likely to express norms in a way that is tailored to the interests and needs of the parties and, in that
tailoring process, to internalize those norms” and “KSR promises justice not because its terms will
produce binding judgments in all cases, but because it is an incremental and plausible step in larger efforts
to change norms reflecting a wide range of social, economic and environmental concerns.”).
79. See generally Bernstein, supra note 17 (demonstrating that contracts have relational value that
far exceeds their enforcement potential); David V. Snyder, Contracting for Process, 85 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 2, 2022 (discussing contracting for process versus simply for goods or services).
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more pandemics and pandemic-like events in store. It is therefore crucially
important to learn from this crisis and envision new, fairer models of commercial
engagement, particularly where human rights are concerned. In the context of
supply chain relations, this means leveraging the regulatory, expressive, and
relational powers of contract for good, by shifting to prosocial contracting models
that promise to do a much better job of upholding human rights and ensuring
legal compliance than extractive contracting.

